Abstract-Rank weights and generalized rank weights have been proved to characterize error and erasure correction, and information leakage in linear network coding, in the same way as Hamming weights and generalized Hamming weights describe classical error and erasure correction, and information leakage in wire-tap channels of type II and code-based secret sharing. Although many similarities between both the cases have been established and proved in the literature, many other known results in the Hamming case, such as bounds or characterizations of weight-preserving maps, have not been translated to the rank case yet, or in some cases have been proved after developing a different machinery. The aim of this paper is to further relate both weights and generalized weights, show that the results and proofs in both cases are usually essentially the same, and see the significance of these similarities in network coding. Some of the new results in the rank case also have new consequences in the Hamming case.
I. INTRODUCTION

L
INEAR network coding has been intensively studied during the last decade [1] , [4] , [15] , [18] - [20] , [22] , [28] , [29] , [34] , [35] . Consider a network with several sources and several sinks, where each source transmits several packets through the network to multiple sinks. Following [1] , [15] , [19] , and [22] , "linear network coding" is defined as the process by which, in each node of the network, linear combinations of the received packets are generated (possibly at random [15] ) and sent (see [19, Definition 1] ). We assume no delays nor cycles.
In this context, errors are considered as erroneous packets that appear on some links, and erasures are considered as the deficiency of the rank of the matrix (called transfer matrix [19] , [20] , [29] ) that describes the received packets as combinations of the ones sent by a given source [20] , [29] . In secure network coding, an adversary (or several) may compromise the security of the network by doing the following, among other attacks: introducing t erroneous packets on t different links, modifying the transfer matrix and obtaining information from the sent packets by wiretapping several links [20] , [28] , [29] .
In classical coding for error and erasure correction [16] , coding for wire-tap channels of type II [24] , [26] , [33] and code-based secret sharing [5] , [21] , [27] , the original message is encoded into a vector c = (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) ∈ F n q , where F q is some finite field. Then, errors, erasures and information leakage happen component-wise. This means that some components of c may be wrong (errors), some components may be erased (erasures), and a wiretapping adversary may obtain some components (information leakage). Using source coding on a network, as in [20] and [28] , all this is considered to happen on some linear combinations: errors are wrong combinations, erasures are losses of combinations, and information leakage is considered in the form of leaked combinations.
In the classical case, Hamming weights [16] and generalized Hamming weights [33] have been proven to describe error and erasure correction and information leakage on wire-tap channels of type II. On the other hand, in recent years there have been several attempts to find a suitable weight and generalized weight to study linear network coding [18] , [20] , [25] , [28] , [34] , [35] . Finally, rank weights and generalized rank weights, introduced in [11] and [20] and [25] , respectively, have been proven to describe exactly the worst case error and erasure correction capability [20] , [28] , [29] , and worst case information leakage on networks [20] , [29] .
Many similarities between Hamming weights and rank weights have been considered since the paper [11] , and for generalized ones since [20] , [25] . However, many results on Hamming weights still have no counterpart in the rank case, or require proofs using a different machinery.
The aim of this paper is to give some alternative definitions of rank weights [11] and generalized rank weights [7] , [17] , [20] , [25] , and then show that most of the well-known results for Hamming weights, classical error and erasure correction and information leakage, can be directly translated to rank weights, network error and erasure correction and information leakage on networks, once the right definitions and tools are introduced.
After giving some preliminary tools from the literature in Section II, the new results in this paper are distributed as follows: In Section III, we gather alternative definitions of rank weights and generalized rank weights from the literature, and propose some new definitions, proving the equivalence between them. In contrast with [7] , [17] , [25] , we also treat 0018-9448 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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relative weights [20] . In Section IV, we study linear equivalences of codes, that is, vector space isomorphisms between codes that preserve rank weights (and generalized rank weights), which allow to say when two codes perform exactly equally in secure network coding. We establish new characterizations of these equivalences that also give a connection with information leakage. We treat for the first time the case of different lengths and obtain the minimum possible lengths of codes, up to these equivalences. In Section V, we establish a way to derive bounds on generalized rank weights from bounds on generalized Hamming weights, and give a list of some of these bounds. In the rest of the section, we discuss what the Singleton bound in the rank case can be, establishing a new alternative version. In Section VI, we introduce the concept of rank-punctured codes, which plays the same role as classical punctured codes, and which are a main tool for the study of rank weights, erasure correction and information leakage, since punctured codewords are conceptually the same as codewords with erasures. We use this to characterize MRD ranks of codes and introduce the concept of information spaces. Finally, in Section VII, we revisit some of the results regarding error and erasure correction and information leakage on networks. We obtain new relations regarding information leakage and duality, estimate information leakage in terms of dimensions of spaces, and propose a slightly different decoder than that of [20] and [28] , proving also the characterization of the correction capability of arbitrary (in particular, F q -linear) coding schemes, which has not been stated nor proven yet.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
Let q be a prime power and m and n, two positive integers. F q denotes the finite field with q elements. All vectors are considered to be row vectors, and we use the notation A T to denote the transpose of a matrix A.
A. Linear Network Coding Model
We will consider the network model with errors in [20] and [28] , where the original message x ∈ F k q m (considered as k packets in F q m ) is encoded by a given source into c ∈ F n q m , whose n components (seen as packets) are sent through a network with n outgoing links from that source node and where a given receiver obtains y = c A T + e, for some transfer matrix A ∈ F N×n q and some error vector e ∈ F N q m . As in [20] and [28] , when treating error and erasure correction, we will consider multicast networks with one source and several sinks, and no delays nor cycles. In the noiseless case, for treating just information leakage to an adversary, we may assume several sources as long as the packets sent by different sources have no correlations. This allows to treat packets from a different source as errors, which give no extra information to a wiretapping adversary by [20, Proposition 5] .
The length of the vector c is defined as n, and corresponds to the number of outgoing links from the source in the network, while m corresponds to the packet size. Therefore, m and n do not play a symmetric role.
Although it is usual in the literature to only consider the case n ≤ m, we consider all cases, and we argue as follows (see also [20, Sec. I .A] for more details): on the one hand, in some Internet protocols, the size of each packet (m) is bounded by some parameters of the protocol, whereas the number of outgoing links (n) is not necessarily bounded. On the other hand, since many computations are carried out over the extension field F q m , requiring m ≥ n may extremely increase the computational complexity of the encoding and decoding.
B. Codes and Coding Schemes
A code in F n q m is just a subset C ⊂ F n q m , whose length is defined as n. We say that C is linear (respectively F q -linear) if it is an F q m -linear subspace (respectively F q -linear). The term arbitrary is used for all codes, including non-linear codes.
Definition 1 ( [20, Definition 7] ): A coding scheme (or binning scheme) with message set S is a family of disjoint nonempty subsets of F n q m , P S = {C x } x∈S , together with a probability distribution over each of these sets.
Definition 2: A coding scheme as in the previous definition is said to be linear if S = F q m , where 0 < ≤ n, and
for all α, β ∈ F q m and all x, y ∈ F q m . Similarly in the F q -linear case (where S = F q , 0 < ≤ mn).
The encoding in the coding scheme is given in [20, Definition 7] as follows: for each x ∈ S, we choose at random (with the chosen distribution) an element c ∈ C x . With these definitions, the concept of coding scheme generalizes the concept of code, since a code is a coding scheme where #C x = 1, for each x ∈ S, and thus no probability distribution is required. In the same way, linear and F q -linear coding schemes generalize linear and F q -linear codes, respectively.
An equivalent way to describe linear (and F q -linear) coding schemes is by nested linear code pairs, introduced in [36, Sec. III.A]. We use the description in [5, Sec. 4.2] .
Definition 3 [5] , [36] : A nested linear code pair is a pair of linear codes C 2 C 1 ⊂ F n q m . Choose a linear space W such that C 1 = C 2 ⊕ W (where ⊕ represents the direct sum of vector spaces) and an isomorphism ψ :
Then we define the sets C x = ψ(x) + C 2 . They form a linear coding scheme called nested coset coding scheme [20] .
If we choose the probability distribution to be uniform, then the encoding can be done as follows: Take uniformly at random c ∈ C 2 and define c = ψ(x) + c .
A given code C ⊂ F n q m , seen as a pair 0 C is suitable for error correction, but is not suitable for protection against information leakage. Ozarow and Wyner proposed in [26] using the pair C F n q m for protection against information leakage on noiseless channels. The idea of nested linear code pairs was introduced in [36] to protect against both information leakage and noise.
Independently, the same idea was implicitly used by Shamir [27] and Massey [5, Sec. 3 .1] to construct secret sharing schemes, and general nested linear code pairs were first used for this purpose in [5, Sec. 4.2], where it is claimed in an informal way that they include all possible linear coding schemes. We now state this in a formal way, omitting the proof, which is straightforward. The F q -linear case is completely analogous.
Proposition 1: Given a linear coding scheme P S = {C x } x∈S , define C 1 = x∈S C x and C 2 = C 0 (recall that S = F q m ). Then, C 1 and C 2 are linear codes in F n q m and 1) C 2 C 1 .
2) The relation given in C 1 by c ∼ d if, and only if, there exists x ∈ F q m such that c, d ∈ C x , is an equivalence relation that satisfies the following:
In particular,
On the other hand, if d : F n q m × F n q m −→ N is the rank (respectively Hamming) distance [11] (respectively [16] ), we define the minimum rank (respectively Hamming) distance of the coding scheme P S as
For arbitrary codes we obtain the usual definition of minimum distance. For arbitrary coding schemes, it is basically the minimum of the distances between the sets C x , x ∈ S.
For a linear coding scheme P S and the Hamming distance d, d(P S ) coincides with the minimum coset distance introduced in [9] or the first relative generalized Hamming weight [24] . For a linear coding scheme and the rank distance, it coincides with the first relative generalized rank weight [20] .
C. Rank Weights and Rank Supports
Now we turn to rank weights. We first observe the following obvious fact from linear algebra. ([11] , [20, Sec. II.D] ): Choose one of such bases α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α m , and a vector c ∈ F n q m . We define the rank support [20] of c as
The rank weight of c [11] is then wt R (c) = dim(G(c)).
From the previous lemma it follows that G(c) (and wt R (c)) does not depend on the choice of the basis. However, from now on, we fix one such basis α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α m . Note that G(c) = G( c ) and thus wt R (c) = wt R ( c ), for every c ∈ F n q m .
D. Trace Codes, Subfield Codes and Galois Closures
Now we gather some tools from the literature regarding trace and subfield codes, and Galois closures. More details can be found in [13] , [16 The following proposition easily follows from [30, Lemma 1] . The equivalence between items 1, 2, 4 and 5 were also noticed in [13] and [17] .
Proposition 2 [30] : For every linear code C ⊂ F n q m of dimension k, the following are equivalent:
2) C admits a basis of vectors in F n q . 3) C has a basis consisting of vectors of rank weight 1. 
III. EQUIVALENT DEFINITIONS OF RANK WEIGHTS AND GENERALIZED RANK WEIGHTS In this section we give new equivalent definitions of generalized rank weights [20] , [25] . In contrast with [7] , [17] , and [25] , we also treat relative weights [20] . Both have been proven to characterize worst-case information leakage and error and erasure correction on networks [20] , [25] .
A. The Hamming Case
We briefly recall the definitions of Hamming weights, generalized Hamming weights [33] and their relative versions [24] . 
B. Existing Equivalent Definitions
We briefly review the existing equivalent definitions of generalized rank weights and their relative versions. We attribute the following lemma to a combination of [30] with [20] for dim(D) = 1, and a combination of [30] with [17] for the general case, and show why:
Lemma 3 [17] , [20] , [30] : For any linear subspace
Proof: It is immediate that dim(D * ) = dim(Tr(D * )) from Proposition 2, and moreover it holds that Tr(D * ) = Tr(D).
The equality wt [20, Lemma 11] for dim(D) = 1, hence the result follows immediately in that case.
On the other hand, [17, Th. 16] states that D) ) and the result follows in the general case. Now we define generalized rank weights, introduced in [25] for n ≤ m, and their relative versions, both introduced in general in [20] :
Definition 7 ( [20, Definition 2] ): For a linear code C ⊂ F n q m and 1 ≤ r ≤ k = dim(C), we define its r -th generalized rank weight as
For a nested linear code pair C 2 C 1 ⊂ F n q m , we define its r -th relative generalized rank weight as 
Lemma 5 ([7, Proposition II.1]): If n ≤ m, the r -th generalized rank weight d R,r (C) is equal to
min{max{wt R (x) | x ∈ D * } | D ⊂ C, dim(D) = r }. (7)
C. New Equivalent Definitions
In this subsection, we give new equivalent definitions of rank weights, generalized rank weights and their relative versions.
Theorem 1: For any linear subspace D ⊂ F n q m , we have that In particular, for every vector c ∈ F n q m , we have that
The following inequality is obtained when choosing the basis B as the canonical basis. It also follows easily from the definitions and was first noticed by Gabidulin [11] when dim(D) = 1:
Proof of Theorem 1: We first prove the inequality ≤:
n q m and all j ≥ 0, and therefore,
Hence, using this and Lemma 3, we see that
where the last inequality follows from (8). Now we prove the inequality ≥: We will show that we may select an appropriate basis B from the given family such that
By Proposition 2, since D * is Galois closed, it has a basis v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v s of vectors in F n q . We may extend it to a basis 
, as desired, and the inequality follows.
We now give the following new equivalent definitions of generalized rank weights:
Theorem 2: For a linear code C ⊂ F n q m and 1 ≤ r ≤ k = dim(C), the r -th generalized rank weight of C is equal to:
where G is a generator matrix of C, ϕ B is as in Theorem 1 and (10) is an analogous description as that of [14, Lemma 1] for generalized Hamming weights, and is expressed in terms of a generator matrix of the code. We now give new equivalent definitions of relative generalized rank weights. Observe that Definition (11) is an extension of Definition (6) for relative weights.
Theorem 3: For a nested linear code pair C
, the r -th relative generalized rank weight of C 2 C 1 is equal to:
where ϕ B is as in Theorem 1, G is a generator matrix of C 1 , the first k 2 rows of G are a basis of C 2 and U I is the projection of U onto the first k 2 coordinates. Now, the last definition is analogous to [37, Lemma 2] for the Haming case. We only prove Theorem 3, since Theorem 2 is obtained from it by choosing C 2 = 0. Lemma 3 , and the inequality follows.
Proof of Theorem 3:
No we prove (5) ≤ (11): Take D as in (11), and define V = D * , which is Galois closed. The natural linear map
by Lemma 3, hence the inequality follows.
Using Theorem 1 and the expression (3), we see that (11) = (12).
Finally, we prove that
q m as in (13), and define
and thus
Using Lemma 3 and Delsarte's Lemma 2,
and we are done.
IV. EQUIVALENCES OF CODES
The purpose of this section is to characterize the F q m -linear vector space isomorphisms φ : V −→ V that preserve rank weights, where V, V are Galois closed.
Observe first of all that wt R (V ) = dim(V ) and wt R (V ) = dim(V ) by Lemma 3, hence dim(V ) = dim(V ) is necessary if we want to preserve all possible rank weights.
A first characterization has been given in [3, Th. 1], for V = V = F n q m . We will see that, due to our new characterizations, equivalent codes are guaranteed to exactly perform in the same way in secure network coding, and not only regarding worst cases (which would be guaranteed just by having the same minimum rank distance). Moreover, in contrast with [3] , we consider equivalent codes with different lengths, which allows to consider equivalent codes that can be applied to networks with different number of outgoing links. As a consequence, we will see which is the minimum possible length of a code equivalent to a given one, that is, which is the minimum number of outgoing links that a given code requires.
A. New Characterizations
Define the sets ϒ(F n q m ) and (F n q m ) as the set of Galois closed linear subspaces of F n q m and the set of subspaces of the form V I = {c ∈ F n q m | c i = 0, ∀i / ∈ I }, for some I ⊂ J = {1, 2, . . . , n}, respectively, as in [20] . We will write just ϒ and if there is no confusion on the space F n q m . For convenience, we also define
The rank weights are defined in terms of the spaces in ϒ (see (4) or [20] ), and the Hamming weights are defined in terms of the spaces in (see [20] , [21] ). We will use this analogy in the rest of the paper.
We have the following two collections of characterizations of Hamming-weight and rank-weight preserving vector space isomorphisms. To the best of our knowledge, only the equivalence between items 2 and 5 has been noticed in the Hamming case, which is an obvious consequence of MacWilliams extension theorem (see [16, Sec. 7.9] 
with N = # I = # J , then there exists a bijection σ :
In such case, we will say that φ is a Hamming-weight preserving transformation or a Hamming equivalence.
Theorem 5: Given an F q m -linear vector space isomorphism
In such case, we will say that φ is a rank-weight preserving transformation or a rank-metric equivalence.
Proof: It is obvious that item 2 implies item 1 and item 3 implies item 2.
We now see that item 4 implies item 3. First, the number of sets in the family ϒ(F n q m ) that are contained in V is the same as the number of sets in the family
To prove that item 5 implies item 4, it is enough to show that, for a given subspace
Finally, we prove that item 1 implies item 5, which is a slight modification of the proof given in [3] . Taking a basis of V in F n q as before, it holds that φ(v i ) = β i u i , for some u i ∈ F n q and β i ∈ F * q m . Since φ is an isomorphism, the vectors u i are linearly independent. Now take i = j and assume that β i = a i, j β j , for every a i, j ∈ F q . Then there exists a basis of F q m over F q that contains β i and β j . Therefore
We have reached an absurd, so there exists 
. This is known as MacWilliams extension theorem (see [16, Sec. 7.9] 
is a Hamming equivalence}.
Proof: The second equality follows from the first one, which we now prove. By Theorem 5, the map ϕ B in Theorem 1 is a rank-metric equivalence, for any basis B ⊂ F n q of F n q m , since it maps vectors in F n q to vectors in F n q . On the other hand, given a rank-metric equivalence φ : F The last equality follows from the third one, which we now prove. First, for every Hamming equivalence φ, it follows from Theorem 4 and Equation (8) 
, and therefore the inequality ≥ follows.
To conclude, we need to prove that there exists a Hamming equivalence φ such that wt H (D) = wt R (φ(D) ). By taking a suitable Hamming equivalence, we may assume that D has a generator matrix G of the following form: the rows in G (a basis for D) are g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g r , and there exist 0 = t 0 < t 1 < t 2 < . . . < t r ≤ n such that, for every i = 1, 2, . . . , r ,
Finally, choose a basis γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . , γ m of F q m over F q , and define the Hamming equivalence φ (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) = (γ 1 c 1 , γ 2 c 2 , . . . , γ n c n ) . Then, φ(D) has a generator matrix whose rows are h i = φ(g i ), which satisfy that h i, j = γ j if t i−1 < j ≤ t i , and
, where I = {1, 2, . . . , t r }, and we are done.
B. Rank Degenerateness and Minimum Length
Now we turn to degenerate codes in the rank case, extending the study in [17, Sec. 6] .
Definition 9: A linear code C ⊂ F n q m is rank degenerate if it is rank-metric equivalent to a linear code C ⊂ F n q m with n < n.
Hamming degenerate codes are defined in the analogous way. As in the Hamming case, rank degenerate codes are identified by looking at their last generalized rank weight. This is the definition of rank degenerate codes used in [17] . However, note that our definition actually states whether a given code does not require the given length, which in network coding means whether a code can be implemented with less outgoing links from the source node.
The next proposition actually gives the whole range of lengths of linear codes rank-metric equivalent to a given one. To prove it, for every V ∈ ϒ(F n q m ) and every basis B ⊂ F n q of V , we define the F q m -linear map
given by Proof: For a given n , assume that there exists a linear
Take V = C * and ψ B as in (14) for some basis B ⊂ F n q of V . As remarked before, ψ B is a rank-metric equivalence and thus C is rank-metric equivalent to C = ψ B (C) ⊂ F n q m . Finally, take n ≥ n = d R,k (C) and C as in the previous paragraph. Append n − n ≥ 0 zeroes to every codeword in C . The obtained code C ⊂ F n q m is linear and rankmetric equivalent to C , and thus also to C, and we are done.
Therefore, d R,k (C) gives the minimum possible length (minimum number of outgoing links required by C) of a linear code that is rank equivalent to C. As an immediate consequence, we obtain the following: Proof: The first part follows from the previous corollary and the fact that dim(C * ) ≤ mk.
l, j e j and e j is the canonical basis of F n q . This is possible since mk ≥ n.
On the other hand, define u i = m l=1 α l x l,i ∈ F n q m , and C = u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u k . Then, C * = F n q m and dim(C ) ≤ k. Taking C ⊂ C, with dim(C) = k, we obtain the desired code.
V. BOUNDS ON GENERALIZED RANK WEIGHTS
In this section we establish a method to derive bounds on generalized rank weights from bounds on generalized Hamming weights, and afterwards we discuss what the Singleton bound can be for generalized rank weights. Due to [20, Lemma 7 and Th. 2], bounds on generalized rank weights directly translate into bounds on worst case information leakage on networks, and therefore are of significant importance.
A. Translating Bounds on GHWs to Bounds on GRWs
Some attempts to give bounds similar to the ones in the Hamming case have been made [7] , [20] , [25] . In this subsection, we prove that most of the bounds in the Hamming case can be directly translated to the rank case.
Note that, since rank weights are smaller than or equal to Hamming weights (by Equation (8)), every bound of the form 
where the last inequality follows again from Theorem 2. Similarly for relative weights. [38] ). We next list some of these bounds, where 1 ≤ r ≤ s ≤ k, and d j = d R, j (C), for all j . Note that monotonicity is one of these bounds, and therefore it does not need a specific proof. Also recall that linear codes in this paper are F q m -linear, and hence the field size is q m , not q. 1) Monotonicity: 
7) [32, bound (20)]:
d r ≥ n − (q m(k−r) − 1)(n − d s ) q m(k−s) − 1 .
Remark 6: A trivial lower bound that is valid for every linear code is d R,r (C) ≥ r , for all 1 ≤ r ≤ k. Observe that a linear code C satisfies that d R,r (C) = r , for every 1 ≤ r ≤ k if, and only if, C is Galois closed. This gives another characterization of Galois closed spaces to those in Proposition 2, in terms of generalized rank weights. In the Hamming case, d H,r (C)
=
B. On the Singleton Bound
In this subsection, we discuss the possible extensions of the Singleton bound to rank weights. We start by giving a brief overview of the bounds in the literature that resemble the usual Singleton bound, both for a linear code C ⊂ F n q m and a nested linear code pair
In [8, Proposition 6 ], a refinement of the classical Singleton bound is given for cyclic codes. By [8, Proposition 5] and duality [7, Theorem] , this bound is
Hence this bound is implied by the classical bound and Proposition 3, or by monotonicity. The description in [8] gives then an alternative description of this bound for cyclic codes.
As a tool for future bounds, we establish the following one. It shows how to obtain bounds for all generalized weights from bounds on the first one or the last one.
Lemma 6: For every linear code C ⊂ F n q m , and for every
The same bound applies to relative generalized rank weights.
Proof: It is enough to prove that, if [20, Proposition 3] . The general case follows from these and the previous lemma.
Proposition 5 (Alternative Singleton Bound): If n > m, then for every linear code C ⊂ F n q m , and every
1 ≤ r ≤ k = dim(C), d R,r (C) ≤ m n (n − k) + m(r − 1) + 1.
For a code pair C
Now, for generalized rank weights, it is easy to see that this bound is sharper than the usual Singleton bound if, and only if,
which is a number in (1, k] if n ≤ mk (the case where the code is not necessarily rank degenerate, see Proposition 4). However, as it is usual and for convenience, we give the following definition:
We say it is MRD if it is 1-MRD. Similarly for r -MDS and MDS codes, replacing d R,r by d H,r (see [33, Section VI]).
We also obtain the bound d R,r (C) ≤ rm from the previous lemma, by induction on r . Therefore, the overview of the Singleton bound becomes now as follows, with notation as above, which improves the bounds in the previous overview:
Remark 7: The bound d R,r (C) ≤ r m is sharper than the alternative Singleton bound if, and only if, n ≥ mk. We know that in this case, C is rank degenerate (Proposition 4). Therefore, for codes that are not rank degenerate, the usual and alternative Singleton bounds are the sharpest ones. Remark 8: When n ≤ m the usual Singleton bound is the sharpest general upper bound on the rank distance, since
Gabidulin codes (see [11] ) are MRD and may have length n, for all n ≤ m, and dimension k, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Since the alternative Singleton bound is sharper for r = 1 when n > m, it follows immediately that, given 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and m, there exists an MRD code over F 
Moreover, we see that d R,2 (C) attains the alternative Singleton bound.
We conclude the section with a simple fact that connects r -MRD codes with r -MDS codes, and which follows directly from (9) .
Proposition 6: A linear code C ⊂ F n q m is r -MRD if, and only if, ϕ B (C) is r -MDS, for all bases
, it is obviously MDS, but also the codes ϕ B (C) are MDS. It can also be easily shown that the codes ϕ B (C) are again Gabidulin codes. Therefore, to prove that they are MRD, it is only necessary to prove that they are MDS.
VI. RANK-PUNCTURING AND RANK-SHORTENING
In this section we discuss what are the operations on rank-metric codes analogous to puncturing and shortening [16, Sec. 1.5] . The main importance of the concept of puncturing is that a punctured codeword is essentially the same as a codeword with erasures, as in the Hamming case. Recall that the shortened and punctured codes of a given code C ⊂ F n q m on the coordinates in the set I ⊂ J are defined, respectively, as
A. The Definitions
For a linear subspace L ⊂ F n q , fix another subspace
, which we will use throughout the section. We then define the projection map Proof:
First we see that φ is a vector space isomorphism. Since dim(V ) = dim(V ), we only need to prove that it is one to one. Assume that π L ,L (c) = 0. This means that c ∈ V ⊥ , but also c ∈ V and V ∩ V ⊥ = 0, hence c = 0.
On the other hand, since 
Therefore, the next definition of rank-punctured code is consistent.
Definition 11: For every F q -linear space L ⊂ F n q , and every code C ⊂ F n q m , we define its rank-punctured and rankshortened codes over
Similarly, for a coding scheme P S = {C x } x∈S , we can define its rank-punctured and rank-shortened schemes over L as P L S = {C L x } x∈S and P S L = {C xL } x∈S , respectively. For a linear coding scheme built from C 2 C 1 ⊂ F n q m , they are the schemes built from C L 2 ⊂ C L 1 and C 2L ⊂ C 1L , respectively. Observe that it is not always true that C L ⊂ C L , as opposed to the usual shortening and puncturing. On the other hand, we see that, for every I ⊂ J , V I ∈ ϒ. Then, it is easy to see that C I = C L I and C I = C L I , regarded as subspaces of V I . Thus the previous definition extends the usual definition of puncturing and shortening. For brevity, we will use just the words puncturing and shortening for rank-puncturing and rank-shortening, respectively. 
, where ψ B and ψ B are as in (14) . That is, we can
B. r -MRD Characterizations
In this subsection, we give characterizations of r -MRD (and r -MDS) codes in terms of dimensions of punctured codes. We start with a tool that generalizes Forney's Lemmas [10, Lemmas 1 and 2] and that is useful to relate dimensions of punctured and shortened codes. Note that [20, Lemma 10] is essentially the second equality in this lemma.
Lemma 8: For every linear code C ⊂ F n q m of dimension k and every subspace L
⊂ F n q , it holds that dim(C L ) = dim(L) − dim((C ⊥ ) L ) = k − dim(C L ⊥ ).
Proof:
The second equality is [20, Lemma 10] 
We will need the duality theorem for generalized rank weights, which has been established and proven in [7] (we will give a shorter proof in Appendix B):
Theorem 8 (Duality [7] ): Given a linear code
Note that, in the next propositions, the equivalence of the two first conditions follows directly from Wei's duality and its corresponding theorem for rank weights, as proven in [32 
The following conditions are equivalent for a linear code C ⊂ F n q m of dimension k, and every 1 ≤ r ≤ k:
The equivalence between the first two conditions follows from the duality Theorem 8, as proven in [7] , and the equivalence between the last two conditions follows from Lemma 8. Now, we prove that condition 3 implies condition 2. Take c ∈ C ⊥ \ 0 and assume that wt R 
and thus (C ⊥ ) L = 0, but this implies that c = 0, which is a contradiction. Hence wt R (c) ≥ k − r + 2. Finally, we prove that condition 2 implies condition 3. Let L ⊂ F n q be such that dim(L) ≤ k − r + 1. Then, by the definition of minimum rank distance (recall (4)), we have that dim((C ⊥ ) L ) = 0, and thus by Lemma 8,
After showing how to compute generator matrices for punctured codes, it can be easily proven that the equivalence between items 2 and 3 generalizes [11, Th. 1].
Corollary 2: The smallest integer r such that C is r -MDS is r = k − d H,1 (C ⊥ ) + 2, and similarly for rank weights.
C. Information Spaces
Next, we define the notion of information space, which plays the same role as information sets in the Hamming case: any original codeword can be recovered from the punctured codeword if (and also only if in the linear case) we puncture on an information space. Therefore, information spaces completely describe the erasure correction capability of a code, and not only worst cases.
Definition 12: Given a linear code C ⊂ F n q m , we say that a subspace L ⊂ F n q is an information space for
On the other hand, given a code pair
In general, for an (arbitrary) coding scheme P S = {C x } x∈S , we say that L is an information
Observe that a set I ⊂ J is an information set for C if, and only if, L I is an information space for C. Note also that π L ,L is always surjective, so it is only necessary to be injective in order to be bijective.
On the other hand, Proposition 8, item 4, shows threshold values on the dimension of a space to guarantee that it is an information space for a given code, in terms of its minimum rank distance, as in the Hamming case. Now we characterize MRD codes using information spaces, in the same way as MDS codes are characterized using information sets. Note that the result is a particular case of Proposition 8, taking r = 1. After knowing how to compute generator matrices of punctured codes, it can be shown that this proposition is essentially [11, Th. 2] . The following two propositions essentially describe erasure correction on networks. The second one also describes the correction capability of punctured codes. They are analogous to [16, 
For the second statement, take c 1 , c 2 and
and extend this to a basis
Proof: With the same notation as in the previous proof, we We can extend this to (arbitrary) coding schemes, just by substituting the code C with a coding scheme P S = {C x } x∈S . The proof is the same.
D. Computing Rank-Punctured Codes
We conclude the section showing how to compute punctured codes. In the Hamming case, this is obvious, since we only have to project on some of the coordinates. In the rank case, we need to solve some systems of linear equations, which is still an efficient computation.
Proposition 12: Given a subspace L ⊂ F n q and one of its generator matrices A (L = row(A) and A has full rank [16] 
and only if, it has a generator matrix A such that A A T = I .
Proof: First assume that F n q = L ⊕ L ⊥ and B is a generator matrix for L . Take x such that xB A T = 0, then xB ∈ L ∩ L ⊥ and therefore, xB = 0, which implies that x = 0. Hence, B A T is full rank and there exists an invertible matrix M such that M B A T = I . Taking A = M B we obtain the desired matrix. Now assume that L has a generator matrix A with 
And now we give a method to compute the generator matrix of a punctured code C L , given generator matrices of C and L. The proof is straightforward and follows from the previous lemma.
Proposition 13 We 
have that G A T A satisfies that row(G
A T A ) = C L ,L = C L ,
VII. SECURE NETWORK CODING
In this section we revisit the description of secure linear network coding in view of the results in the previous sections. Recall from Subsection II-A the linear network coding with errors that we are considering, which is the one in [20] and [28] , and recall from Subsection II-B that we assume that the source encodes the original message x ∈ F k q m into c ∈ F n q m using some coding scheme P S = {C x } x∈S . As explained in the introduction, we consider an adversary that may compromise the security of the network by doing three things: introducing t erroneous packets on t different links, modifying the transfer matrix A and obtaining information about the original message x by wiretapping several links.
As in [20] and [28] , if the receiver obtains the vector y = c A T + e, t = wt R (e) and ρ = n − Rk(A), then we say that t errors and ρ erasures occurred. In Appendix C, we will see how to consider erasures as errors.
A. Erasure Correction and Information Leakage Revisited
In this subsection we study the problems of erasure correction and information leakage, which are closely related. The amount of leaked information on networks was studied in [20] . We will see how the punctured construction in Section VI can describe this.
Consider a linear coding scheme built from C 2 C 1 ⊂ F n q m . Denote by S and X the random variables corresponding to the original message and the encoded message by the previous nested coset coding scheme, respectively, and π I the projection onto the coordinates in I ⊂ J . It was shown in [12] and [21] that (16) for every I ⊂ J , assuming a uniform distribution, where the last equality follows from Lemma 8, and I(X; Y ) = H (X) − H (X|Y ) is the mutual information of the random variables X and Y .
On the other hand, by wiretapping s links in a network, an adversary obtains the variable X B T , for some matrix B ∈ F s×n q . Assuming uniform distributions, and defining L = row(B) ⊂ F n q , it is proven in [20, Lemma 7] that
where the last equality follows from Lemma 8.
Therefore, the information leakage is tightly related to the dimension of punctured and shortened codes.
Observe that I(S; X B T ) ≤ dim(C 1 /C 2 ) and the equality holds if, and only if, L is an information space for C 1 , C 2 as in Definition 12. Remember from Proposition 10
is an information space for P S . In Appendix A, we show how to efficiently obtain the original message if L is an information space.
Next we give a relation between information leakage and duality, whose philosophy is similar to that of MacWilliams equations, since it means that knowing the information leakage using the code pair C 2 C 1 is equivalent to knowing the information leakage using the "dual" code pair
It is convenient to introduce the definition of access structures:
Definition 13 [12] : We define the Hamming access structure of the nested linear code pair C 2 C 1 as the collection of the following sets
. Given a set A ⊂ P(J ), we define its Hamming dual as A ⊥ = {I ⊂ J | I ∈ A}.
Definition 14: We define the rank access structure of the nested linear code pair C 2 C 1 as the collection of the following linear subspaces of
. Given a set B ⊂ {L ⊂ F n q linear subspace}, we define its rank dual as
We now present the relation with duality, where the Hamming case for r = 0 was already proven in [ 
Proof: It follows from the following equality, which follows from Lemma 8,
Proposition 15: Given a nested linear code pair C 2 C 1 ⊂ F n q m and 0 ≤ r ≤ = dim(C 1 /C 2 ), we have that
Proof: Again, it follows from the following equality, which follows from Lemma 8,
Finally, as consequences of Proposition 7 and Proposition 8, we obtain the description of the access structures for MDS and MRD code pairs, respectively. The Hamming case (Corollary 3) also follows immediately from [12 
for every I ⊂ J . Corollary 4: If both C 1 and C 2 are MRD, then
for every linear subspace L ⊂ F n q . In general, we can compute the information leaked in many cases, but if the involved codes are not MDS (respectively, MRD), then there is always a collection of sets (respectively, subspaces) for which we do not completely know the information leaked. We first establish this fact for the rank case, which follows from Proposition 8, and give an example in the Hamming case:
which only depends on dim(L) and not on the space L.
If moreover, k 2 + r 2 − 1 < k 1 − r 1 + 1, and taking
Example 1: If C 1 and C 2 are algebraic geometric codes constructed from a function field of genus g [32] , then we have the Goppa bound [32, Th. 4.3] 
It follows from Proposition 7 that, for the code pair C 2 C 1 ,
B. Error and Erasure Correction Revisited
In this subsection we see how the rank-puncturing can describe error and erasure correction in networks. We will follow a slightly different approach than that of [20] and [28] .
We will treat the coherent case, that is, the case in which the matrix A is known by the receiver. For simplicity, we will consider the case of one code C ⊂ F n q m , which may be nonlinear. At the end we will show how to adapt the results to arbitrary coding schemes. Observe that [20, Th. 4] only deals with linear (meaning F q m -linear, as in the rest of the paper) coding schemes.
As we saw in the previous subsection (see also Appendix A), if the sink node receives y = c A T and the number of erasures is less than d R (C), we can perform erasure correction. For that, we can take a submatrix A of A which is a generator matrix of L = row(A), since the other rows in A are redundant. All choices of A will give the same unique solution.
When there are errors, we would also like to take a submatrix as before and the corresponding subvector of y. However, it is not clear that the decoder in [20] and [28] for A and for A will behave in the same way. We now propose a slightly different approach.
Fix the positive integer N and the matrix A ∈ F N×n q , which are assumed to be known by the receiver.
Definition 15 ([28, Eqs. (9) and (12) Fix nonnegative integers ρ, t, with Rk(A) ≥ n − ρ. We will assume that, if c ∈ F n q m is sent and y ∈ F N q m is received, then A (c, y) ≤ t, or equivalently, that y = c A T + e, with wt R (e) ≤ t. Define L = row(A). We will denote A ⊂ A if A is a submatrix of A that is a generator matrix of L.
Next we recall the decoder in [28] and present a slightly different one.
Definition 16 ( [28, eq. (10) ]): We define the decoder c = argmin c∈C A (c, y).
Definition 17:
For each A ⊂ A, we define the decoder:
where y is the vector obtained from y taking the coordinates in the same positions as the rows of A. We will say that one of the previous decoders is infallible [28 In [20] and [28] , sufficient and necessary conditions for the decoder corresponding to A being infallible are given. We will now state that the same conditions are valid for the decoders corresponding to all the submatrices A. In particular, all of them give the correct (and thus, the same) answer.
The main difference is that now the proof only relies on Proposition 10 and Proposition 11, where we do not need the machinery developed in [20] and [28] , in total analogy with the Hamming case, as proven in [16, Th. 1.5.1], and for the decoding, we do not need all rows in A. Moreover, although it is not difficult to adapt the proof in [20, Th. 4] for F q -linear coding schemes, our proof works for any (arbitrary) scheme. and A ⊂ A. Assume also that the sent message is c ∈ C and we receive y = c A T + e, with wt R (e) ≤ t. Define y and e as the vectors obtained from y and e, respectively, taking the coordinates in the same positions as the rows in A. Therefore, y = c A T + e.
We have that Rk( A) = Rk(A) and wt R ( e) ≤ wt R (e) ≤ t, and on the other hand, 
Actually, we can effectively compute the set of possible sent messages, regardless of the distributions used. If ψ : F q m −→ W is the map in Definition 3, we can see both ψ and π L ,L as maps
where ψ is an isomorphism and π L ,L is surjective. Therefore, L (ψ(x) ), where c = ψ(x), we can obtain the set of possible sent messages, which is
regardless of the distribution, and in the case of uniform
Moreover, if we know B, we can obtain all vectors in x + ker(π L ,L • ψ) by performing matrix multiplications and solving systems of linear equations.
Assume that G 1 , G 2 , G are generator matrices of C 1 , C 2 , W , respectively, where C 1 = C 2 ⊕ W , and the first rows of G 1 are the rows in G 2 , and the last rows are the rows in G . Then, for a message x ∈ F q m , the encoding consists in generating uniformly at random a vector x 2 ∈ F k 2 q m and defining c = x 2 G 2 + xG = (x 2 , x)G 1 . Therefore, the projections onto the last coordinates of the solutions of the system π L ,L (c) = x(G 1 B T B ) will be all the vectors in
If L is an information space for C 2 C 1 , i.e., dim(C L 1 /C L 2 ) = , then all solutions of the previous system coincide in the last coordinates, which constitute the original message x ∈ F q m .
APPENDIX B ALTERNATIVE PROOF OF THE DUALITY THEOREM
We will now give a different proof of the duality Theorem 8 (proven in [7] ) that follows from Proposition 15. Note that a theorem analogous to Wei's duality theorem [33, Th. 3] has not been given for relative generalized Hamming weights, nor for the rank case. However, Proposition 15 and its Hamming version work for any nested linear code pair.
We will need the following lemma: 
The proof is as follows. By monotonicity and cardinality, it is enough to prove that both sets on the right-hand side are disjoint. Assume that they are not disjoint, then there exist i, j, s such that d i = j and d ⊥ s = n + 1 − j . By the previous lemma, the first equality implies that max{dim(C L ) | dim(L) = j } = i. Again by the previous lemma, i > s + k − n − 1 + j . Now interchanging the role of C and C ⊥ , which also interchanges the roles of i, s; the roles of j, n + 1 − j ; and the roles of k, n − k; we have that i ≤ s + k − n − 1 + j , which is absurd.
APPENDIX C SEEING ERRORS AS ERASURES
We will show now that erasure correction is equivalent to error correction if the rank support of the error vector is known. This is analogous to the fact that usual erasure correction is equivalent to usual error correction where the positions of the errors (the Hamming support of the error vector) are known. This is a basic fact used in many decoding algorithms for the Hamming distance, which now we hope can be translated to the rank case. Proof: Assume that y = c + e = c + e , where c ∈ C and G(e) = G(e ). Then y A T = c A T = c A T . Since Rk(A) = n − t and t < d R (C), it follows from the previous theorem that c = c .
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